452
International Law Studies - Volume 62
The Use of Force, Human Rights, and General International Legal Issues
Richard B. Lillich & John Norton Moore (editors)

SOVIET·AMERICAN ARMS NEGOTIATIONS-1960-68:
A PRELUDE FOR SALT
Eric W. Hayden
As 1968 drew to a close, it seemed
likely that the year ahead would sec
both the United States and the Soviet
Union committed to defense budgets
which would rival the largest peacetime
military spending of either nation. 1 For
the United States, whose defense spending for the past several years had been
centered on the Vietnam war, the year
ahead would most probably be devoted
to further development of its "new
generation" of strategic missiles: Poseidon, Minuteman III, Spartan ABM, and
further refinement of the multiple warhead technique. For the Soviet Union,
whose increased defense budgets for
each of the previous 3 years had concentrated on missile power, past ohserved
pallrrns would most likely persist: development of a multiple reentry vehide.
further modification of the ABi\1 Gola~h
and Fractional Orbital Bombardlllcn L

System (FOBS), and a step-up ill development of the mighty 25 megatoll
SS-9 missiles.
On the hori1.oll, however, was n
possihle altt'rnatiVI~ to tlw t'olltillllillg
arms spiral. III signing the Nonproliferation Treaty 011 1 July 1968, President
Johnson announced that the Soviets had
agreed to enter into discussion on ways
to limit and reduce both offensive and
defensive nuelear weapons systems. Yet,
as bright as that horizon appeared, it
was soon elouded-at least momentarily-by two separate events: a cooler
U.S. assessment of the U.S.S.R. following the invasion of Czechoslovakia in
August and the election of Richard
Nixon, who had throughout his campaign charged tht' ineumht'nt adlllilli:;tration with creating a "se('urity gap for
America." So as 196B closed, there
scl'lIIed no relief 10 thc mad 1II0l11cnllllll
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of the arllls llllildup which had been in
progress since 1945.
Certainly the arllls race is not unique
to the post-World War II era. In 1919
there was little doubt that a major cause
of tIle First World War had been a raee
to arm. Consequently, the Covenant of
the newly created League of Nations
pledged a "reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent
with national safety and the enforcement by common aetion of international obligations." Bu t the massive
firepower unleashed by the Axis in the
first years of World War II testified to
the League's failure in realizing the
dream of its founders.
Two and a half decades later, the
men who gathered to organize the
United Nations sought to insure that the
hours of futile League debate over
disarmament would not be repeated by
its successor. Instead, the objective of
the new organization was to disarm the
enemy states, to create a joint security
force to prevent future aggression, and
to pledge members against the threat or
use of force. The term "disarmament"
appears only twiee in the charter. Article II grants the General Assembly the
power to "consider the prineiples
governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments," and article 47
authorizes the Military Staff Commillee
to advise the Security Couneil on the
"regulations of armaments and possible
disarmament. "
The explosion of atomic weapons in
August 1945 suddenly added an unexpected element to the arms equation,
forcing the United Nations to take
significant steps beyond the vague and
general charter provisions on arms control and disarmament. In its first resolution, the General Assembly, on 24
JiIllllary 1946, unanimously created the
Unit('d Nations Atomic Energy COIllmission (UNAEC) to (·Iilllinatc all weap!lng ('lIpaill!' of IlllH~g degtruetion lind to
eontrol the (I!'lIe!'ful use of atomic
energy. Buoyed by Great Power sup-

port, the U.N. seellled to be embllrking
on an active program to regulate atomic
arms lind to sce~ lItomie disarmmnenl.
Yet, over the years which have followed, progress in arms negotiations,
both within and without the United
Nations, has been painfully slow and
unproductive. Since 1945 the arms issue
has been a matter of almost eontinuous
debate, with some 60 formal disarmament conferences between the United
States and the Soviet Union. Both sides
realize that a race for nuclear weapons is
potentially a race for mass extinction, as
well as an excessively costly undertaking. Yet, mankind is in the fourth
decade of the nuclear age without any
real progress toward arms eontrol or
disarmament.,
In the meantime, the Soviets have
achieved both an atomic and a nuclear
capability. Both sides have graduated
from reliance on bombers to reliance on
missile delivery vehicles. Each nation
has dcveloped sea-based missile systems,
multiple warheads, and antiballistic
missile defense. The peak of hope which
the world experienced in July 1968 and
the valley of disappointment a few
months later have typified the fluctuating arms scene since 1945.
World War II came to a close with
the United States in ,posscssion of an
atomic monopoly in the face of overwhelming Russian conventional military
superiority. In the space of a few brief
ycars, Allied wartime cooperation dissolved and was replaced by increasingly
cold peacetime competition between
East and West. On the arms front the
Soviet goal was, quite naturally, to
overcome drastic strategic inferiority.
The United States, for its part, sought
to shift the control of atomic power to
international authority provided, however, that its own vulnerability in conventional forces could not be exploited
hy the Soviets. The explosion of tlw
first Sovid atomi(' wellpon in August
19'~9 symbolized the unbridgeable gap
in lIrms goals and positions
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characterizing thc first 7 years following
the war.
] n 1953 the Americans got a !WW
President, and the Russians buried
Stalin. That same year the Soviet Union
exploded its first thermonuclear device,
only 9 months after the United States
had accomplished thc same feal. Both
nations soon realized they were like two
scorpions in a bottle, each capable of
killing the other but only at the risk of
its own life. During these years cautious
probing began, the absolute hostility of
the preceding era was modified, and
partial measures of arms control were
sought. "Peaceful coexistence" was
born, as each nation sought to surpass
the other economically, hoping somehow that the awful destructive might of
nuclear war might be avoided. The gap
appeared to be narrowing.
The sixties began with the q.uest for
general and complete disarmament.
However, it became incrcasingly obvious
that this broad goal was impossible
because of the deep suspicions still
harbored by each side. Yet, these years
saw considerable progress in achieving
more limited mcasures, among which
were the banning of nuclear tests everywherc execpt underground, the establishing of a "hot line" between Washington and Moscow, the renouncing of the
orbiting of nuclear weapons, and the
signing of the Nonproliferation Treaty.
It appeared as if the gap had becomc, to
a certain degree at least, bridgeable.
Before turning to a more detailed
analysis of successcs and failures of arms
negotiating in the 1960's, however,
there arc certain matters which should
be touehed upon first in order to e1arify
the discussion which follows.
First, a definition of terms. Although
the terms have often been indiscriminately interchanged, there is a vast
difference bet ween "di~ar",am('nt" ,md
"arnu; control." Thl' forml'r i~ tl\l' (·Iilllination of all wl'ap(}n~ ~y~lenH; and production. I t is, of course, a utopiml goal
which history has shown to be virtually

im possib-Ic. "/\ rms control" encompasses anyone of a broad range of
pm;siblc arms agrecments se(~king to
reduce or limit arms, thereby decreasing
thc likelihood of armcd contliet or
limiting the distinctivcness of war. The
only area in which agreement has occurred to date is in the arms control
area. The far broader realm of disarmament remains the ideal, emerging
most often in U.N. speeches and in
other forms where the principal end in
sight is propaganda gain.
It is here that we come to the second
area deserving comment; i.e., that the
postwar arms picture has been muddied
and muddled by debate directed at the
public rather than at the opposition.
Agreement has not always been the
primary goal of arms talks. Too often
states have sought to project images of
themselves as peace-loving. This has
been especially true in the years since
the cmergence of the Third World and
the concomitant East-Wcst struggh: to
win the allegiance of that massive conglomerate. Too of len a state's arms
proposals are so biased to ils own
advantage that rejection is all bllt inevitable, and with rejection eorm's the
inevitable decline in the rejector's international prestige.
President Eisenhower's "open ski(·s"
proposal of 1955, whih: aLLr:lctive to thc
world, was bound to encounter the
Russians' resistance because of their
invariable opposition to revealing their
e10sed society and secret military installations to the anxious eye of the American camera. No such fear permeates
American thinking because our society
and its military installations arc a maller
of public record. While the Soviet rejection was inescapable, so were the inll'rnational propaganda gains for the
United States.
The West is not alOlIl: in tuning ilt'
propll:-:al:-: to llll: ear of tlw world, a~ lllll
Soyil'l (·fforl in IIII' lall: 19bO's 10 han
the flight of nuclear armed aircraft OYer
international borders illustrates. Coming
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in the wake of the loss of a U.S. plane
with nuclear weapons in Spanish waters,
this proposal had great international
appeal but was patently impossible from
the vantage point of the United States.
In this same vein, the Soviets use the
term "disarmament" to describe all
arms talks. This despite the fact that,
for the most part, their proposals have
not been disarmanet per se but rather
only partial measures at arms control.
The Americans, on the other hand, have
used the terms "limitation, regulation,
and control of arms" and, since the late
1950's, "arms control," thereby subjecting themselves to Soviet asscrtions
that the West is not rcally intcrested in
disarmament or arms reduction but only
control ... meaning a reduction m
Soviet national sovcreignty.
A third point is the specious argument that the possession of arms leads
to arms races which, in turn, cause wars.
Bertrand Russell used to argue eloquently in favor of unilateral disarmamcnt, believing as he did that the
pOE'session of nuclcar wcapons would
perforce cause war. Unfortunately, he
overlooked the important fact that it is
not arllls in lind of themselves which
Il'ml to war, but rather the men who use
them. Even if the world were to disarm
complctely, nuclear and otherwise, it
would not have eliminated the political
problems, ideological conflicts, and national mistrusts which sow the sceds of
war.
Fourth, we turn to thc diffcrcnces in
Soviet and Amcrican negotiating practices. Since 1945 the Soviets have had
only seven ehief arms negotiators; all
these men have been well versed, professional arms negotiators. In contrast, the
U.S. example has been less than meritorious, with the expertise of our
numerous ncgotiators variously waxing
and waning. Bernard Barueh headed a
highly respl'clt'd and compelentteam of
negotiators, but his rcsignation in early
1947 was followed by 8 years of haphazard eoordination and direction in

U.S. arms negotiating practice. Not until
Harold Stassen was given Cabinet status
as President Eisenhower's Special Assistant on Disarmament did a U.S. negotiator have easy and assured access to the
ear of the President. Prior Soviet doubts
as to American sincerity in talking arms
reductions were inevitable. Stassen's
abrupt removal 2 years later and the
laek of any replacemen t only confirmed
Soviet suspicions about U.S. arms
policy.
The fifth and final point is that for
both the United States and the Soviet
Union thc pursuit of arms control and
disarmament has been a function of
foreign policy. I t has never been for
either nation a goal within a vacuum; it
has always been intimately tied to
national security, as well as international political issues. The web is tight
and closely twined. Throughout the
years the arms positions of both sides
have fluctuated, often drastically, depending on the propaganda perspective,
depending on the relative strategic
standing, and depending on the particular foreign policy goals at any particular
time. Like each nation's foreign policy,
the arms poliey of each has becn an ad
hoc affair, ever adaptable to the exigencies of thc situation. As one side has
acted, the other has reacted; this aetionrI'al,tion phenomenon has occurred repeatedly throughout the arms sceneboth politically and technologically.
Perhaps the one consistency throughout has been this: the Soviets have
approached arms talks from the position
of inferior power seeking to reduce the
American superiority; the Americans,
0!1 the other hand, have had the advantage of superiority and have generally
sought to persuade the Soviets to opt
out of the arms race and accept the
f;tatus quo. For instance, in 1964 when
the U.S. strategic delivery force surI'as~(~d that of thc Soviet Union hy a
ratio of somc 4 to 1, the United Slales
proposed a freeze on further production
of nuclear delivery vehicles. Thc
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thought was that the deterrent value of
each side's force was adcquatc to prcvcnt a first strike by the other. Yet the
Soviets reasoned otherwise, unwiIling to
settle for a second-best position. Like
Avis, there has been a great deal of pride
in the Soviet drive to catch and overtake
the number one power.
The pages which follow deal with
this pursuit and try to assess the important similarities and differences between
each nation as they have sought to
integrate their national interests with
the ideal of arms control.and disarmament over the last decade.
x x x x x
On Inauguration Day, 1961, Premier
Khrushchev, who had refused to have
anything to do with President Eisenhower after the U-2 incident, cabled the
new American President expressing his
hopes that there would be a "radical
improvement" in Sovict-American rei ations. 2 Clearly, rcnewcd efforts at
achieving a mutually satisfactory agrcement on arms limitations would have to
rank high on the list of priorities in any
gcnuine allempt to radically improve
relations between Washington and Moscow. In the initial statement of his first
press conference 4 days aftcr becoming
President, John F. Kcnnedy gave grcat
evidence of his concern over arms control by announcing the appointment of
John McCloy to coordinatc the disjointed American arms bureaucracy. By
September, Congress had crcated the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA), and for the first time since the
departure of Harold Stassen from the
scene, the United States had a full-timc
staff of arms experts. President Kennedy's thoughts behind the creation of
the new agency were eloquen tly expressed in his Inaugural Address when
he said:
Let us never negotilltc out of fellr.
But let us never fellr to negotiate.
Let both sides, for the first time,

formulate sl'rious and preci~e
proposals for the inspection and
control of arms-and bring the
absolu te power to destroy other
nations under the absolute control
of all nations.
Having criticized Eisenhower's administration for failing to bridge the gap with
the Soviets, Kennedy was determined to
build such a bridge himself.
Despite these flickers of hope, the
beginning of the new era in postwar
arms negotiations was far from bright.
The international political climate remained tense even though the U-2 incident had been all but forgotten. The
turmoil in Laos was reaching its peak.
The Congo was ablaze. Even the most
casual observer of international events
knew where the Bay of Pigs was. The
Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting in Vienna
in July 1961 showed that neither leader
would back down over the mounting
problem of Berlin. The next month the
Soviets broke the test moratorium and
began flexing their muscles with explosions of over 50 megatons. Meanwhile,
the Berlin WalI had gone up-a symbolic
blockade to agreement on more than
the divided city.
Developments at the ar/llS Icvel only
heightened the tensions. Elected on a
phltform attacking the Republicans for
having permi ttcd a "missile gap" to
develop, the Democratic administration
quickly set about to reverse the tide and
regain the undisputed American strategic lead. Defense spending went up,
the Minuteman program was accelerated, the production of Polaris submarines was intensified, and, following
the Soviet example, testing was resumed. On the conventional front, the
"flexible response" strategy for NATO
was supported by larger American
standing forces in Europe.
T h c action-reaction phcnomcnon
whieh hnd prompted thi!' l'ol\(','ntrall',l
American response to the Soviet ICBM
and sputnik aehievemcnts led the Russians, in turn, to renewcd efforts to
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regain the strategic momentum. Besides
resuming nuclear testing, they increased
their defense budgct, halted the demobilization steps taken in 1960, and
conducted large-scale conventional
operations in 1961. For both sides the
age of satellite reconnaissance had begun, with the United States launching
its first Samos satellite in early 1961
and the U.S.S.R. its first Cosmos series a
year later.
In the midst of these developments,
the two sides continued to reaffirm
their support for the concept of General
and Complete Disarmament (GCD) that
Khrushchev had advocated 2 years
earlier. For example, on 25 September
1961, the President addressed the U.N.
General Assembly, warning that:
Today, evcry inhabitant of the
planet must contemplate the day
when this planet may no longer be
habitable. Every man, woman and
child lives under the sword of
Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being
cut at any moment by accident,
or miscalculation or by madness.
The wcapons of war must be
abolishcd before thcy abolish us. 3
While GCD was impossible to realize
in light of thc prevailing political and
military tcnsions, public commitmcnt to
the concept was nccessary in the campaign for political support in the Third
World. Consequently, 5 days before
Kennedy's U.N. speech, the Americans
and the Russians had issued a joint
statement outlining a set of Agreed
Principles, pledging both nations to thc
achievement of GCD at the .carliest
possible date. 4 The eight-point program
called for the elimination of all nuclcar
and nonnuclear weapons, forces, production, and dclivery vehicles, plus the
end of military spending. The various
stages to be agreed upon would be
balanccd to insure that neithcr side ever
gaincd the upper hand before both had
completely disarmed; furthermore, cach
stage would be supervised by an interna-

tional control authority within the U.N.
framework.
By March the next year, the campaign for GCD carried to the creation of
the Eightecn Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), composed of five Western, five Communist, and eight nonaligned countries. Over the following
months of 1962, both major powers
presented at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee elaborate and
complex three-stage plans for GCD. 5
Despite the joint statement of the previous fall, however, major differences
were to prevent any confluence of views
leading to an agreement on GCD.
The essence of the Soviet approach
was that all nuclear delivery vehicles and
all foreign bases be climinated in the
first stage. This would, naturally, crase
the West's superior strategic delivery
capability and insure the U.S.S.R. extremely favorable odds in case of a
conventional war in Europe over Berlin.
Their second stage provided for the
destruction of all remaining nuclear
weapons. This provision came to be
modified later in the talks, however, as
the Soviets accepted the U.S. logic of
continucd mutual strategic deterrence in
the disarmament process; accordingly,
the Soviets conceded the American
argumcnt that a limited numbcr of
stratcgic weapons ought to bc rctained
as a nuclear "umbrella" until the end of
the third and final stage in any disarmamen t accord.
The American GCD platform centered on frcezing-rather than immedia tel y eliminating-existing strategic
weapons. The first stage called for a
reduction by 30 percent in all such
weapons, with 50 percent of the remainder to be destroyed in the second
stage, and the rest eliminated as the
final step. This mcthod of disarmament
would, quite obviously, insure the perpetuation of U.S. strategic might
throughout the process. One is remindcd of the Soviets' earlier advocacy
of an across-the-board, one-third cut in
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armed forces to insurc their own continucd conventional superiority.
The differences between the two
sides in 1962 over disarmament were
basically the same as they had been for
15 years. As always, the Soviets' main
interest was to get the United States to
relinquish as soon as possible those
weapons in which it was strongest and
the U.S.S.R. rclatively weak; to wit,
strategic weapons. In contrast, the
Amcricans still preferred to stretch the
proccss out over a longer period of time,
during which a viable system of international control inspection might be established and put into operation. Here an
old problem was raised. The United
States wanted such a system set up early
in the game; further, it wanted inspection of not only those weapons being
destroyed ("verification of disarmament') but also of all those remaining
("verification of remainders'). Only this
way, it was argued, could it be certain
that weapons were, in fact, being destroyed and, most importantly, not
being replaced. But the only inspection
the Soviets would even agree to discuss
was of those weapons actually being
destroyed; anything more, such ns n
search for concealed wenpons, would be
tantnmount to a breach of national
sovereignty.
In addition to the usual disagrecments, there was another. The joint
Russo-American statement of Agreed
Principlcs of 20 Septcmber had called
for the assigning of national forces to a
U.N. military force"which would, as the
charter had originally intcnded, insure
world peace. However, the Russians
objected to such a provision in the
American GCD proposals at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in
the spring of 1962. Despite the influx of
new U.N. members which had begun
early in the 1960's, the U.S.S.R. was
still a minority on the world body. It
hnd no intention of risking its own
security by abolishing its defense establishment and relying on an international

one which would be dominated by the
United States and its allies.
In short, despite the efforts made, no
agreement on GCD was possible. Political differences and strategic disparities
would have prevented agreement even
without the fundamental differences in
both sides' proposals. Those differences
only underscorcd the fact thalthcre was
no real convergence of mutual interest
by either the United States or U.S.S.R.
except on the broad and utopian principle of General and Complete Disarmament.
GCI) had always been more a Russian than an American project. The
United Stales had responded to the
inlial Soviet proposal with one of its
own b·ecause of the ovcrriding political
nccessity. To have remained silent on
this popular-if impractical-topic
would have been to leave itself open to
Soviet charges that the United States
was not, after all, interested in peace
and disarmament By late 1962, howcver, GCD was no longer thc major
Soviet arms priority. After a brief interlude, the emphasis shifted once again
back to the more practical search for
partial measures en route to "eventual"
General and Complete Disarmament.
That brief interlude was Moscow's
allempt to redrcss the arms imhalarwe
by placing Soviet missiles and heavy
bombers in Cuba where they would be
aimed at the underbelly of thc United
States. By mid-1962 the Americans had
demonstrated their ability to outspend
and outproduce the Russians; any possible "missile gap" had been overcome,
and our strategic arsenal surpassed that
of the Soviet Union by a ratio of about
4 to 1.6 There was only one way the
Kremlin could regain the momentum,
and that was by an all-out effort to
increase its nuclear delivery production;
but that meant problems. Soviet agricultllml output was below its projected
levels; consumer production was falling.
Khrushchev had promised the capitalists
hc would bury thcm through peaceful
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coexistence, spccifically, through economic competition. Could the economy
respond in meeting that goal at the same
time that a total effort was being
m~unted to produce more ICBM's?
Even if it could, would not the United
States do the same, keeping the existing
ratio the same?
Yet something had to be done. In the
Soviet system an important measure of
success in foreign policy is victorymilitary, diplomatic, or psychological.
As one author has noted, "Without a
continuing series of foreign policy successes ... the dynamic drive of the
Communist movement might threaten
to stall.,,7 The Russian leaders were no
doubt asking themselves if the Congo,
Laos, and persistent strategic inferiority
were not evidences of such stalling.
They had hoped to regain some of
the lost impetus through the series of
nuclear tests conducted in late 1961.
The pressure on Berlin was another way.
Nevertheless, the Wcst con tinued to
outproduce them strategically, and the
new President had made his commitment to the German city unequivocal.
To make mallers worse, Communist
China and Cuba were bccoming morc
and more vocal in their criticism of
Moscow's leadership of the Communist
world. Thc only alternativc to the
shoddy performance of the past fcw
years seemed to be the emplacement of
long-range ballistic missiles and heavy
bombers on the doorstep of the Americans.
The cvents taking place in Octobcr
1962 fall ou tside the range of this
paper. What is important for us arc the
effects of these events on subsequent
arms negotiations.
As Khrushchev said of the crisis
shortly after it was over, "There had
been a smell of burning in the air." This
odor convinced both side'S that it was
tillll' to takc skI's to hridgc tlll~ gal'
which had sl'parated tlwm sinec 19 /1.5.
GCD was put aside, and a sincere effort
was made to come up with measures of

partial disarmament. The most important area of progress was in the banning
of tests in the atmosphere, under the
water, and in outer space.
The testing of nuclear weapons became a matter of acute international
concern by the mid fifties. The intense
political maneuvering of both sides over
the latter half of the decade was not
much more than window dressing designed to cover up their halfhearted
allempts to achieve an actual agreement
to end tests. An initial problem had
been the American refusal to consider
tcsting separately from a comprehensive
"package" deal including conventional
and strategic arms level safeguards
against surprise attack, and control of
objects cntcring space. But world pressure for a ban proved too much, and
Washington's stance was modified the
next year.
However, once again, inspection
blocked agrccment. A multitudc of
questions further complicated matters.
How were inspection posts to be
manned, by national or international
teams of scientists? Was the number of
inspection stations to be proportional to
the numbcr of ullcxplaincd scismic
signals detected yearly, or should there
be a fixed number based on the nation's
geographic size? H9w many on-site inspections per year were appropriate'? Or,
in the event manned inspection stations
were rejceted, what about setting up
black boxes in each nation? In that case,
what kind of device should be uscd;
how many were necessary; who would
decide where each was to be installed;
and how often throughout the course of
a year would they be activated? Finally,
regardless of whatever system was
adopted, what method of punishment
ought to be accorded the violators?
Rising above these many questions was
the loud Russian voicc claiming that any
insl'eeLioll amoun hod to an I!X('($siv(~
degree of interference with the national
sovcreignty of Russia.
The particular detail which finally
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kept the discussions from bearing fruit
was the debate over the number of
on-site inspections. As long as thc international c1imatc opposcd any testing,
thcre was no chance for a partial treaty
pcrmit ting only underground tcsts.
Hencc, some type of inspection seemed
inevitable. By March 1961 the Soviets
had indicated their willingness to accept
three on-site inspections per year; the
United States, pressing for 20, then
reduced its requirements to 12. But a
d~tente was not in the making, as the
Russians then withdrew their offer of
three and said they would tolerate no
on-site inspections. Further, they added
a new demand which had been made
famous in the U.N_ dispute over the
future of the Secretary General's officc:
that a troika commission bc established
to administer any test ban treaty. 8
When they also shifted ground by saying
that a test ban could only be discussed
as part of a total GCD package, it was
obvious that stalemate had overtaken
the issue. The talks were indefinitely
suspended.
Agreement might have been rcached
throughout these frustrating years, however, on an uninspected parti,11 test ban
treaty in which underground testing
would be permitted. But such an accord
was not forthcoming. The U.S. Atomic
Encrgy Commission had already decided
that it preferred open air to undcrground tests. 9 Further, therc was still
the matter of principle. The United
States was trying to force the Soviet
Union into acquiescing to some sort of
inspection measure.
Both sides resumed testing in the fall
of 1961. The international pressure for
a ban, however, pcrsisted, and once each
side had satisfied itself of its. latest
strategic advances, the talks resumcd
that winter of 1961.
To circumscribe the thorny insll(~c
tion issue, the Sovie L<; suggested a han
on all except underground tcsts. But the
West balked, still determined that it
would have its way: a complete ban

with inspection. Bllt by the late summer
of 1962, frustration had persuaded the
United States to accept the earlier
Soviet proposal for a limited test ban
treaty. It was then the Soviets' turn to
resist, aq,ruing that they wanted a total
ban. Perhaps they' were uneonvinced
that their level of technology would
insure that they could detect all American tests. More likely they simply did
not want a treaty and were maneuvering
to prevent agreement. When the issue of
inspection was then raised, as it inevitably had to be in discussing a total
ban, the differences centered 011 the old
question of the number of on-site inspections. The Russians revived their
previous figure of three. The West, now
more confident of its detection capability, dropped its requirement to seven,
plus 10 unmanned posts. 1 0
At this point the Cuban missile crisis
intervened. The long-fcared nuelear war
almost became a reality, and both nations saw the immediate need to
stabilize the helter-skelter arms spiral
which had come so perilously close to
pushing the world to the brink of
disaster. Each side resumed its unilateral
tcst moratorium early ill 1963. 'I'll(:
possibility of some kind of formal limit
on testing looked better than it had in a
long time. Besides the ncar war the
previous October, there were other rca·
sons for this turn of events.
First, no technological breakthrough
appeared imminent for either side. Their
respective tests in late 1961 had brought
each to its strategic peak, and any
limitation on further tests would not be
damaging.
Second, an end to testing was propitious for both nations, although for
different reasolls. For the United States,
a test ban would mean that Iwr undisputed lead in the arms race could noL
bl~ risked by futurc Sovil'l developments. TIll! Soviets, resigl\('d 1110111('1\tarily aL least Lo their absolute strategic
inferiority, could still draw satisfaction
from thc fact that theirs was an
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adequate deterrent capability. If the
United States could be kept from testing, perhaps Russia might somehow be
able to achieve a breakthrough in thc
meantime.
Third, economics madc a test ban a
welcome prospect for both nations; it
was time to turn to butler, especially in
the U.S.S.R., and leave guns for a later
day.
And fourth was the proliferation
is~ue. Too many states were on the
verge of realizing a strategic capability.
An end to tcsting might keep the
nuclear club small. Of particular
concern were China, yet to detonate her
first atomic device and whose likely
refusal to agree to a test ban would at
least be a propaganda gain for the Soviet
Union and Europe, in the midst of
negotiating with the United States for a
Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF). Here
the Soviets must have hoped that the
appearance of dbtente might reduce
pressures within NATO for a nuclear
capability. This could even aggravate the
already strained NATO alliance. The
British had just been vetoed by the
French from joining the COllllllon
Market, and Fr:II1~e was at odds with
her allies, especially the United States,
over her role within NATO and her
aspirations for a United Europe.
By July all of these factors had
become reason enough for both superpowers to reach a limited agreement.
Doth sides met in Moscow and within
10 days had drafted and signed the
Moscow Treaty prohibiting all nuclear
explosions in the atmosphere, under
water, and in outer sIJace. The question
of inspection prevented any prohibition
of underground testing; to this day, it
continues as the one stumbling block to
any further enlargement of the Moscow
Treaty. 0 therwise, the treaty represen tl'd th!' ~rreatest convergence of .inlI'rests iU)twl'('n till' two nations yl'l
lIl'hiev(~d in postwilr ilnm; I\('gotiations.
Both hnd relenll'd 011 thl'ir previous
uClIlnnus that any lest ban be cOlllpn:·

hensive. While the treaty provided for
no reduction in arms per se, it was
unique in providing at least a partial
freeze on nrms levcls. Above all, it was
the first formal agree men t sincc 1945
requiring nuclear nations to rcduce
some on.going military activity.
The treaty had many critics, including the American nuclear scientist
Edward Teller. Among the arguments
uscd against the trcaty wcre first, tliat it
would keep the Unitcd Statcs from ever
overcoming the highcr Russian level of
IJIcga ton nage. This argument, however,
failcd to take into account the fact that
we already had a greater variety and
larger number of smaIIer and more
accurate weapons than did the Soviets.
If they were ever to catch us, it would
only be by enduring the higher costs of
underground testing.
Second, it was argued that while the
Unitcd States would bc scrupulous in
adhering to the trcaty, thc U.S.S.R.
would probably end up testing a fraction of a foot beneath the ground,
thereby fulfilling the letter of the law
but, in effect, violating the trenty. But
this objection overlooked the interim·
tional pressurc which would keep both
sides from violating the conditions of
thc ban.
Third, it was claimed that the trcaty
was weak in failing to cut stockpiles and
in failing to deal adequately with proliferation. But stockpilcs were too sensi·
tivc a subject to he dealt with at this
point, and the possibility of prolifera.
tion was reduced every time another
nation agreed to the terms of the trea ty.
Well over 100 nations have signed the
treaty. As was initially feared, China
and France have refused to do so. For
France, the refusal goes back to Dc
Gaulle's search for "grandeur." As part
of his internal policy, he sought unity
aflt' .. years of turllloil; by (~xpn~ssing his
indqll'lIllelll:(' frOIll tIll: lJ n ilt'd S tnt(~s
both by refusing to sign and by develop.
ing the force de frappe-he hoped to

462
persuade his countrymen of that independence. As part of his continental
policy, he hoped to sway Ger-many from
its loyalty to the United States and to
fall in with his plans for European
unity. The French-German treaty of
cooperation of early 1963 had been part
of that design. Finally, on the international level, De Gaulle's refusal to sign
was part of his policy of giving France
an independent talking point.
Khrushchev had hoped, however
futilely, that China could be convinced
to sign the treaty. But Peking balked,
arguing that Khrushchev was sdling out
to the West and, not incorrectly, that
Russia was trying to put China under its
own strategic dominance. In rejecting
the treaty, China continued its search
for nuclear parity and political leverage
against the U.S.S.R. and the United
States. Its behavior was reminiscent of
that of the Soviet Union IS years earlier
in its refusal to agree to American
attempts to keep it from acquiring a
strategic capability.
Another area of partial agreement
which came in the wake of Cuba was
the decision in June 1963 to join
Moscow and Washington by a "hot
line." I t was hoped that this would
provide rapid communications to reduce
the risk of a preemptive attack in a
future crisis situation. The idea had
been suggested in the spring of 1962 by
the United States, but it was not until
the near disaster over Cuba that agreement was possible.
The "hot line" was an outgrowth of
the observer concept which had been
bantered around for years by both sides
in connection with the inspection issue.
Observers had been proposed to help
verify that neither side was preparing a
surprise attack against the other. Heretofore there had been no progress,
largcly because of the national sovereignty problem. The 1962 mi~sile cri~is,
however, provided th(' necessary impetus. A simple cOlllmunieations problem could have thrown the world into

nuclear war. As the Greek Xenophon
told his Persian counterpart back in the
4th century B.C.,
I know of cases ... when people,
sometimes as a result of slanderous information and sometimes
merely on the strength of suspicion, have become frightened of
each other and then, in their
anxiety to strike first before anything is done to them, have done
irreparable harm to those who
neither intended nor even wanted
to do them any harm at all. I have
corne to the conviction that misunderstandings of this sort can
best be ended by personal contact. ... 11
Technology and the arms race made
imperative in 1963 the "personal contact" which had so concerned this
general 2,500 years ago.
The remainder of the 1961-68 period
continued to see a great flurry of
activity on the edge of the disarmament
question. GCD continued on occasion
to raise its head, but military and
political relatiolls betwcen the two
superpowers precluded any rapprochement on this broad topic. In addition,
certain factors were working against the
Soviets' pushing GCD as they once had.
For one, the Sino-Soviet displlt(~ was
worscning, and thc U.S.S.R. did not
want to add fuel to the Chinese argument that the Soviets were colluding
with the Americans. For another, the
anti-Khrushchev faction which assumed
power in 1964 was not about to adopt
the fallen leader's shibboleth. Nevertheless, while GCD was taking the back
scat, considerable attention was devoted
to achieving some partial measure of
arms reductions. Each side was very
much aware that the threat of nuclear
war still had to be contained.
Guiding Soviet military thinking at
Ihis time was the paramollnt eOJl('crn
that Ihe American slrategie lead b(~
ov(·rtaken. The Cuban crisis had dramatically demonstrated ll\(~ bargaining
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power provided by a superior nuclear
arsenal. Consequen tly, the U.S.S.R.
turned its attention to developing its
own strategic forces by improving its
ICBM's, by developing an ABM system,
and by planning a fleet of ballistic
missile nuclear.powered submarines.
While these steps were going on, the
U.S.S.R. was advocating, among other
things, the withdrawal of foreign troops
from foreign territory, a NATO·Warsaw
Pact nonaggression treaty, the creation
of a nuclear free zone in central Europe,
the elimination of heavy bombers, and
the expansion of the test ban treaty to
cover underground explosions. 1 2 Most
of these proposals were old hat. The
realization of any of them would help
reduce Soviet vulnerability. They might
also halt the prolifcration of nuclear
weapons to NATO allies, particularly
West Germany.
The United States, in contrast, fclt
no such military insecurity. Despite the
brink to which Cuba had brought us, we
were clearly the number one nuclear
power. Onec the Minuteman expansion
plans were completed by the midsixties,
there would be no need to enhance our
already impressive ICBM might. No
Soviet missile expansion appeared imminent. Besides, our attention was focused
on a nonnuclear engagement in Southeast Asia.
As the search for partial measures
went on, hopes for agreement in certain
areas such as a limit of delivery vehicles,
a ban on the usc of nuclear weapons,
and a nonaggression pact between
NATO and the Warsaw Pact were evasive. In others, however, some accord
was possible: a cutback on the production of certain fissionable materials, the
prohibition of nuclear weapons in orbit,
and agreement on curtailing proliferation. A discussion of each of these six
items follows.
The ehanccs of reducing nuclear
weapons per se Wl'n~ so slight that Ihc
limit'ltion of delivery vchicles was
turned to as perhaps a more aLLractive

alternative. In January 1964 at the
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva, the United States
urged a production freeze on all sueh
vehicles, specifically bombers and missiles, as well as on ABM's. A freeze at
current levels would be clearly advantageous to the United States, considering our sizable lead in bombers and
missiles. Likewise, an agreement limiting
ABM's would also be in the interest of
the United States, in view of the
Soviets' developing capability in this
regard and the American lag in producing any counterpart. Not unsurprisingly, therefore, the U.S.S.R. rejcted
this American proposal. 13 For the rest
of the period, the two sides never evcn
came close to any agreement on the
limiting of dclivery vehicles.
The Soviet effort to ban the use of
nuclcar weapons at this time was another version of the earlier campaign to
"ban the bomb." By the 1960's, as the
GCD talks were showing, any effort to
eliminate nuclear weapons was futilc.
But banning thcir use might yield better
results; at least world opinion thought
so. A 1961 Gencral Assembly rcsolution
dcclared that the use of nuclear weapons would violate the spirit of the U.N.
and its charter. Five years later another
Gencral Assembly resolu tion called for a
world disarmament confcrellcc to hall
the usc of these wcapons. In the fall of
1967, a Soviet draft eo,nvention was
passed by the Assembly prohibiting the
usc of weapons of mass dcstruetion.
Despite thesc three attempts, however,
no convention was ever agreed to by the
United States and thc U.S.S.R. The
primary obstacle was U.S. opposition to
such a ban. We were not about to erase
a basic pillar of the NATO allianee-thc
use of tactical nuclear weapons against a
Warsaw Pact army.
Soviet liopes of a nonaggression
treaty fared no beLLer. Such a NATOWarsaw Pad treaty would It:lve been
more a symbolic victory for the Soviets
than a military gain. For it would have
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meant American negotiations with East
Germany, thereby entailing a possible
modification to the adamant U.S. refusal to recognize Walter Ulbricht's government.
In July 1966 Brezhnev and Kosygin
went one step further and suggested
that both NATO and the Warsaw Pact
be abandoned. The independent actions
of France vis-a-vis the Western alliance
had probably encouraged the Russians
to believe that the crack in the NATO
superstructure was widening. NATO is
far more of a thorn in the Soviets' side
than the Warsaw Pact is in the West's.
The former brings American troops precariously close to Russia, while the
latter does not reciprocate in kind for
the Soviet Union. The end of NATO
would be a military coup for the
U.S.S.R., to say nothing of the psychological gains it would also bring. Obviously, the United States would not
acquiesce to any such abandonment of
its allies. Yet, the Soviet Union persisted
in its host of demands designed to
weaken or destroy NATO, demands
ranging from the withdrawal of all U.S.
troops from Europe to the abolition of
the pacl.
All efforts aimed at a partial agreement on arms control were not entirely
futile during this period, however. In
January ] 964 at the Eightecn Nation
Disarmament Conference, the United
States proposed the halt of production
of fissionable materials for weapons use;
short of this measure, the U.S. proposal
also suggested an interim step by which
such a reduction could be realized
"through both sides closing comparable
production facilities on a plant-by-plant
basis, with mutual inspection. »14 Sovict
objection was inevitable. Such a frceze
would put them at a disadvantage in
light of their own smaller stockpiles of
fissionable material. As if that wcre not
enough, thew was the old in!lpcetion
qualJlllire again. But :3 1II0nth!l later a
dramatic change occurrcd, with both
sides announcing simultancously

n:spective unilakral rcductions in the
production of ecrtain of these materials,
specifically plutonium. Besides the
propaganda value of such declarations,
there was the added fact that each
nation had already produced more than
sufficient quantities of plutonium for its
own usage.
Any additional and more substantive
agreement between Washington and
Moscow appeared dim as the Russians
continually cited Vietnam as a roadblock to meaningful accord. Nonetheless, the end of the 1961-68 period saw
two of the most meaningful arms agreements yet achieved by the two countries. Together, the Outer Space
Treatyl5 of 1967 and the Nonproliferation Treatyl6 signed the next year
combined with the earlier Antarctic
(1959) and Moscow (1963) Treaties to
form the crux of the postwar arms
accords.
The question of outer space went
back to the middle of the previous era.
In early 1957, with the Soviet earth
satellite breakthrough just around the
corner, the United States urged the
peaceful usc of outer space by all
nations. 17 The U.N. General Assembly
in 1961 adopted this same tack, declaring that space ought to be restricted
to only peaceful purposes. Two YCllrR
later, 011 17 Octoiu:r 196:3, II joillt
Soviet-American statement was adopted
by the Assembly, calling on all states to
"refrnin from placing in orbit around
the earth any objects carrying nuclear
weapons or any other kinds of weapons
of mass destruction. ,,18 This joint resolution was possible once the Amcrieans
had dropped their insistence that space
launchers be inspected 1I11d OIlCl' thl'
Soviet::; Iwd aballdollcd their dl'nHlIlu
that all military activity ill outcr space
be prohibitcd.
The 1967 splice trcaty betwl'clI thc
Unitt'd Statl'!l, II.S.S.R., allli Britaill,
like thl' 19b:1 rClloln tioll 011 whidl it Wlltl
based, did 1I0t outlaw rccollllai8s11llce or
cOllllllullieations satellites nor did it
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prohibit potential usc of outer space for
other military purposes. Like the resolution preceding it, it eonccntrated on
banning weapons from outer space. But,
in addition, it went one step further,
prohibiting military installations of any
kind on planetary bodies. Both sides
had recognized the potentially disastrous results of a frenzied race to orbit
nuclear weapons, and they sought to cut
it off before it began. Furthermore,
they sought to guarantee that outer
space be free for exploration and use by
all states.
Along with the Antarctic Treaty,
banning all nuclear and nonnuclear military activity in that continent, the
Outer Space Treaty is the only SovietAmerican arms accord yet achieved
covering both nuclear and nonnuclear
weapons.
The third substantive arms agreement
between 1961 and 1968 was the Nonproliferation Treaty. Although some
sort of nonproliferation agreement had
1)I'('n mentioned as early as the midfift if'g, it remained secondary to a test
han arrangement. Still, the one area in
which the two superpowers had been in
almost unbroken agreemen t since the
1940's was their rcspective unwillingness to share nuclear sccrets with their
allics. This dcspite the massive quantities of military assistance-funds, advisers, and equipment-which both had
lavished on their friends. The only U.S.
exception was its 1958 agreement with
Britain to share nuclear knowledge; the
only Russian exception was its early
atomic assistance to China in the
1950's, believed to have been withdrawn in 1960. These deviations aside,
the basic consensus has been that the
smaller the nuclear club the better.
Otherwise, there would be no guarantee
against a catalytic war with small
powers setting off a conflict between
thc superpowers; Iikcwise, then: would
be no way of keeping nudl'ar weilpons
frolll being used in local wars alllong
third nations.

A central issue of the meetings of the
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference in the midsixties was how to
halt the spread of nuclear weapons.
Many similar drafts were presented by
both sides, yet there was no agreement
until 1968. The problems were several.
For one, the Soviets insisted that plans
for the MLF he dropped hefore any
nonproliferation agreement would he
possihle. Although the MLF was intended to keep nuclear weapons from
Germany, the Russians' fear was a possible German hegemony over this type
of international nuclear force. Another
area of difference was the nature of
protection to he given those nonnuclear
nations who signed the treaty. Third
was the matter of inspection. Both the
United States and U.S.S.R. favored International Atomic Energy Association
(IAEA) inspeetion of plants to insure
their output was for only peaceful use.
But while the superpowers were
agreeing on the principle of inspection
(hecause Soviet territory was not involved!), the members of Euratom were
protesting against IAEA inspection,
arguing that the chances for espionage
within such a large international body
were too great. Fourth, as the Soviets
were striving with the Americans for a
nonproliferation aceord, their enthusiasm was at times diluted by the
chilling Chinese attacks against their
alleged conspiracy with the West.
Despite thcse ohstaclcs, the events of
June 1967 inspired progress. The 6·day
war raised the specter of nuclear war in
the Middle East. The Chinese nuclear
test that same month underscored the
possibility of Japan and India turning to
independent nuclear self-defense capahilities.
The inspection issue was quickly
resolved, as it was agreed that the IAEA
would conduct inspcction, contingent
on t'al'h nation's l1l~gotiat ing separately
with that organ. An attempt to lIIl'l~tllw
security fears of the nonnuclear powers
was made in a U.N. resolution proposed
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jointly by the United States, the
U.S.S.R., and Britain calling for prompt
action against any nuclear aggression.
This was the first real postwar example
of Great Power cooperation designed to
implement the Security Council's theoretical unity of purpose in the face of
aggression.
The simultaneous signing in Washington and Moscow of 1 July 1968 of the
Nonproliferation Treaty was possible
only because that rare phenomenon in
postwar politics had occurred: the
prime antagonists had become the prime
collaborators. The final success was a
product of the conjuncture of interests
between both nations. Despite their
outstanding political differences, most
notably Vietnam and the Middle East,
there was enough room for agreement
on the need to halt proliferation. The
MLF was dead. There was no threat
posed to Soviet national sovereignty.
The Sino-Soviet dispute was at its most
bitter level, and, no doubt, the Soviets
needed the semblance of friendship
from somebody. And the possibility of
other nations soon feeling the need to
develop their Own nuelear capabilities
had become all too real.
Despite these hopeful signs of partial
agreement along the road to disarmament, the strategic race had far from
leveled off. For the Soviets, the yl'ars
after Cuba were years of substantial
development in ABM, Fractional Orbit
Bombardment Systems, and ICBM capability. For the United States, despite the
quicksand of Vietnam, these years were
not without strategic significance, particularly in the development of a multiple warhead, the Minuteman III, and the
initial conversion to Poseidon.
In January 1968 the American Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara
said that, "In terms of numhers of
l'l'paratcly targetable, survivahle, acclIrate, reliahll' \\'arlll'a!l:;, our :;tralt'gie
fon'l's art· supl'rior to thol'l' of I hI'
Sovie t Union. "19 l\leanwhilc, the
Soviets were striving valiantly to surpass

the United States. "From Soviet writers
and from Soviet behavior ... it seems
clear that superiority in all realms .•• is
a value cherished by the Soviet political
and military leadership and a value
worth great investmen t and effort."2 0
As this arms spiral went on, the Institute for Strategic Studies observed for
1967 what could well be said of the last
several years of the 1961-68 period:
"Undoubtedly, the great missed opportunity ... was ... a Soviet-American
understanding on mutual restraint in
new strategic technological developments.... ,,21
Still, as the period elosed, there were
some signs that perhaps the bridge of
agreement which had been spanned during the 1960's in limited areas might be
further enlarged to inelude other more
significant areas. A nine-point Soviet
statement at the signing of the Nonproliferation Treaty suggested in general
terms a wide range of subjects for
further discussion, including a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a ban on
chemical and biological warfare, and the
demilitarization of the scabed. What was
most significant in this potpourri of
themes was the expression for the first
time of a willingness to discuss measures
to limit nuclear weapons and strategic
delivery vehicles.
The years 1961-68 covered the spectrum from the campaign for General
and Complete Disarmament to the ncar
outbreak of nuclear war. In between
were sandwiched several areas of partial
agreement. These included the "hot
line," the agreement to limit production
of certain fissionable materials, the
Outer Space Treaty, and the Nonproliferation Treaty. While not as sweeping
or encompassing as the more optimistic
would have hoped, these accords still
represented a considerable degree of
progrl'ss toward lIrlllS control frolll the
1''\ llt'rienct~ of carlil'r yearg.
TIIl'l'e sl'vernl an'a:; of agn'clIll'nt
were po:;sible for various rt'aSolls. Olle,
their limited nature; alllcft the United
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States anel the Soviet Union free to
pursue their respective programs of military expansion. Two, the fact that none
involvcd actual arms reductions or affected the military capability of either
nation; none reduced U.S. superiority,
and none limited Soviet efforts to redress the imbalance. Three, while each
dcalt with a matter of not inconscquential importance, they still dealt with
matters peripheral to the arms race.
Space was still of moot military value in
1967, and neither the test ban nor
nonproliferation arrangemen ts afrected
the production or deployment of nuclear weapons. Four, no in ternationul
inspection organization was created by
any of the agreements.
The willingness of the Soviets in July
1968 to discuss limits on strategic weapons systems presaged a new chapter in
the struggle to reach a mutually satisfactory arms limitation agreement. The
invasion of Czechoslovakia the next
month ancI the 1968 American Presidential campaign delayed but could not
postpone that chapter popularly known
as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(SALT).
x x x x x
Drspite the fnet that this eggay IlllR
focuseci on Soviet-Anll'riean arms IlI"gotiations of the 1960's, some observations on progress of the SALT talks to
date seem appropriate, especially in
view of the fact that SALT represents
the first real effort to tackle the vital
matter of strategic weapons.
Parity had made the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks possible. Our PolarisPoseidon submarine fleet and greater
progress on multiple warheads were
balanced by both the more sophisticated Russian ABM system and massive
25 megaton SS-9 missile capability.
While thl' United S talt's surpasgrci the
Soviet Union in J I)hl) ill gheer IlIll1lilrrs
of missiles, it nppenred likcly that the
Russian defense system could limit

considerably the nUl\lber of AIIII:ric:all
missiles ultimately reaching target; in
addition, the SS-I) could prohnbly wipe!
out even our hardened Minuteman III
silos.
In agreeing to the SALT talks, both
sides decided not to let political questions interfere with progress. Further, it
was initially agreed that limits on both
offensive and defensive weapons were to
be sought.
Despite these encouraging signs,
progress in thc five conferences22 to
date has been negligible.
The basic U.S. proposal has called for
a numerical ceiling on lIuclear delivery
systems-land-based ICBM's, submarine
carried missiles, and airbornc bombsthnt eithcr side would bc allowed to
maintain. Changes would be permitted
in the offensive forces within that
ceiling; for example, substitu ting seabased for land-based missilcs. In addition, concerned with the rapid ratc at
which the SS-9 is bcing produced, wc
have urgcd a sublimit on deployment of
that particular wenpon. As a further
part of the U.S. package, Washington's
chief negotiator, Gerald Smith, has
stressed that thc United States wants
either a ban or limit on both nations'
ABM systems, including a control on
miggile defense radnrs.
The Soviets have, [Will the: Allwrielm
point of view, been somewhntless than
cooperative. In the fall of 1970 in
Helsinki and the spring of 1971 in
Vienna, they countered thc entire U.S.
package by proposing an ABlVI-only
agrecmenL In making this suggestion
the Soviets sought to confine thc respective ABM systems to Moscow and Washington' rcstricting each network to
about 100 missiles. But as President
Nixon said in his state of the world
message in February of this year, the
U.S. position was still that ,my agrel!IIIt'lIt at thl' SALT talks ollgh L 10 eO\'l'r
1I0t ollly defellsive, but al~o offensivl:
wenpons.
The White House insistence on a
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simultaneous treatment of both weapons stems from at least two factors. One
is the concern that Soviet upgrading of
the SA-5 surface-to-air missiles surrounding western Russian cities could
make them integral components of any
ABM network. Another is the argument
that an ABM-only agreement would
remove the main American bargaining
chip. The hope has been that the
nascent U.S. Safeguard system might be
used in getting the Russians to limit
their own SS-9 production. The fear is
that if an ABM-only accord were
achieved, the Soviets might balk further
SALT negotiations and go back home to
concentrate on increasing their ICBM
capability which already outnumbers
ours by some 1,500 to 1,054.
There has been another major area of
disagreement as well that centers on the
definitions of "strategic" and "tactical."
On the one hand, before shifting to its
ABM-only stand, the U.S.S.R. had insisted that all nuclear weapons systems
capable of reaching Soviet soil be included in any agreement on offensive
weapons. To the United States this
meant only bombers and land- and
sea-based missiles; but to the Soviets it
meant that the 500-odd U.S. aircraft on
NATO bases and on 6th Fleet carriers in
the Mediterranean he included. i\ecording to the U.S. argument, these are only
tactical wcapons and fall outside any
stratcgic limitations agrcement. On the
other hand, the Soviets had refused to
eonccde that their 700 intermediaterange missiles aimed at the heartland of
Western Europe ought to be limited.
They argued that these, too, arc only
tactical weapons for use in the event of
a NATO invasion of Russia.
Yet, th~ road has not been all rocky
despite these problems. For one, Soviet
and American experts agreed in Vienna
this past spring to improve the "hot
line" joining Moscow and Washington
by using two cOllllllunications satellites,
one American and one Russian. For
another, agreement was also reached for

joint planning to avoid World War 1lI by
an accidental missile launch by either
superpower or by a third nation. As a
result, data on the more sophisticated
American fail-safe and electronic locks
are being passed to the Soviets so that
they might improve their own command
and control safeguards on nuclear systems.
By far the most hopeful sign was the
20 May 1971 joint statement issued a
week before the end of the fourth
SALT round. That statement continued
to be reflected in the fifth round. In
essence, both countries said thcy would
concentrate on limiting ABM's and
agree to "certain mcasures" with respect
to the limitation of offensive stratcgic
weapons. Perhaps the Soviets have
rccognized that the cost and marginal
effectivencss of such systems make
thcm less vital than was once believed.
From the U.S. point of vicw, the political pressure of an upcoming election
year may well force the Prcsidcnt's
hand. With his trip. to China hopefully
soon to become a rcality, hc would
certainly like to have in his baek pocket
an agreement with the Soviets by the
fall of 1972.
In any event, optimism rings the air.
As one correspondent wrote from Helsinki last July:
Conference sources confidently
speak of the possibility of a partial SALT agreement being
reached before the end of the
year. They note that both delegations arrived in Helsinki with instructions to work for "concrete"
results and that the fifth round
has made a good running start
with ad hoc technical groups alrcady working 011 thc eomplcte
dctails involved in a specific
treaty.23
Assuming that some ABM agrcement
is forthcoming, that still leaves the most
prickly issues for a second stage SALT
agreement, one which would presumably seek those "certain measures"
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with respect to offensive weapons; specifically, this would be some kind of
limit on bombers, missile submarines,
ICBM's, an~, above all, MIRV systems.

The handling of these questions awaits
the writing of a concluding and, hopefully, final chapter in these intricate
postwar arms negotiations.
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